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A citizen’s experience of politics in a representative democracy is shaped by the 
extent to which she/he is politically ‘certain’. For those voters who have a strong 
sense of identification with a specific party, the act of voting is less a choice among 
competing alternatives than an opportunity to reaffirm one’s partisanship.2 However, 
for ‘uncertain’ voters, who consider two or more parties as potentially viable vote 
choices, the act of voting entails first discovering, and then expressing electoral 
preferences. Such individuals must make a selection from multiple (i.e. at least two) 
potential alternatives; meaning that their votes represent the outcome of uncertain 
and variable processes of deliberation regarding the merits of competitors for public 
office.  
One aspect of electoral uncertainty that is much commented upon, but not well 
understood empirically, is the role of media: does information encountered when 
consuming news media influence voters’ political calculations? Can media exposure 
‘persuade’ undecided voters, or make decided voters less certain of their political 
preferences? A number of recent studies have highlighted the causal effect of the 
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 An Appendix to this article is available at http://whatever.org. A complete replication package is 
available at http://wherever.org. 
2
Cees van der Eijk and Mark Franklin, Elections and Voters (Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan, 2009).   
media environment on vote choice, with several using similar methodological 
innovations to those developed in this paper.
3
 The research presented here brings 
novel empirical evidence to bear on two specific questions: does using the Internet as 
a source of political information influence the electoral uncertainty of voters, and, if 
so, what is the overall direction of that influence? 
We investigate these questions using data from the 2011 Irish general election 
campaign, one of Europe’s most volatile post-war elections. Along with a volatile 
electorate, Ireland also has variable geographical distribution of broadband coverage 
– a quirk of Irish life that is vital to our research design. The difficulty of arguing that 
the Internet (or any media for that matter) exerts an independent ‘effect’ on its users 
is that the choice to go online is itself driven by an array of social, economic and 
political factors, which can also explain voter uncertainty.
4
 This fact of life creates 
the epistemological problem of causal endogeneity. However, media choice is also 
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driven by technological availability: if a media source is unavailable to an individual, 
then by definition she/he cannot select it as a news source. A quasi-random variation 
in broadband availability allows us to tackle what Mondak
5
 refers to as a 
fundamental barrier to demonstrating media effects. In his words, 
 
"If media truly are a nearly all-pervasive force, then we are left with a 
variable that does not vary. Largely for precisely this reason, researchers 
have struggled to demonstrate the existence of media effects on political 
behaviour. Methodological leverage on a question evaporates when there 
exists no contrast group, no persons who are not exposed to the variable of 
interest.” 
 
 Variation in levels of broadband penetration in the Irish territory provides such a 
control group of citizens who are not exposed to the variable of interest (i.e. high 
speed internet). Therefore, we develop an availability-based natural experiment 
employing an instrumental variables modelling approach that, we argue, allows us to 
treat online newsgathering as an independent variable, and political certainty as a 
dependent variable in our analysis. The take-away message of our study is that 
browsing the Internet for political news during the 2011 Irish general election 
campaign led to discernibly higher levels of political uncertainty among voters.  
Specifically, going online made a voter significantly more likely to consider multiple 
parties as viable vote choices. Our results hold for different operationalizations of 
voter uncertainty and for different model specifications.  
                                                 
5
 Jeffrey J.  Mondak. Nothing to Read: Newspapers and Elections in a Social Experiment (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1995), p.159. 
In the next section, we provide some context on the Irish case, before outlining our 
theoretical expectations and empirical hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
Internet use and electoral certainty. Subsequently, we describe the data and 
methodology used to test these hypotheses, before presenting the results of our 
analysis – as well as a series of tests confirming the robustness of our core finding. 
We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results for understanding 
how the Internet impacts electoral behaviour.  
 
The 2011 Irish Election 
 
The data gathered for this study pertain to the 2011 Irish election. The reasons for 
selecting the Irish case were twofold. First, we were able to avail ourselves of data 
that facilitates the causal modelling of Internet effects (as detailed in the next 
section). Second, and more importantly, the 2011 Irish election was by far the most 
volatile in Irish history and it also ranks among the most volatile elections in West 
European history.
6
 The result saw the collapse of the seemingly rock-solid electoral 
dominance of Fianna Fáil, which had been firmly entrenched as the leading party in 
Irish electoral politics since its first victory in 1932. To those who follow Irish 
politics closely, however, the result was not a surprise. The last months of the 
outgoing administration saw an unprecedented conflagration of economic, fiscal and 
                                                 
6
 Michael Gallagher, ‘Ireland's Earthquake Election: Analysis of the Results’ in Michael Gallagher 
and Michael Marsh, eds., How Ireland Voted 2011: The Full Story of Ireland’s Earthquake Election, 
(Dublin: Palgrave McMilland, 2011) pp. 139-72;  Peter Mair, ‘One of Europe’s Most Volatile 
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employment crises, which culminated in an Irish ‘bailout’, and the imposition of 
strict conditionality by the ‘troika’ of the European Union (EU), the European 
Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
 
As these crises 
unfolded from late 2008 onwards, the government parties (Fianna Fáil and the Green 
Party) saw their popularity plummet, and, as the results in Table 1 show, all of the 
opposition parties, as well as several Independents, benefitted from newly available 
electoral support, with Fine Gael and Labour making the greatest gains.  
 
Table 1. 2011 Irish general election results.  
 
Party Seats % 1st Pref % Swing 2007 
Fine Gael 76 36.1 8.8% 
Labour Party 37 19.4 9.3% 
Fianna Fáil 20 17.4 -24.1% 
Independent 15 12.6 6.8% 
Sinn Féin 14 9.9 3.0% 
Green Party 0 1.8 -2.8% 
Socialist Party 2 1.2 0.6% 
People Before Profit Alliance 2 1 1.0% 
South Kerry Independent 
Alliance 
0 0.2 0.2% 
Workers' Party 0 0.1 0.0% 
Christian Solidarity Party 0 0.1 0.0% 
Note: Incumbent government parties in bold.  
Long before the results that led 2011 to be described as Ireland’s ‘earthquake 
election’7 Marsh had made the argument that ‘a majority of (Irish) voters appear to 
                                                 
7Gallagher, ‘Ireland's Earthquake Election: Analysis of the Results’.  
be open to persuasion according to the balance of short-term forces’8 and Kroh et 
al.’s comparative study 9  ranked Ireland’s population among the most politically 
uncertain of the 15 pre-2004 European Union member states. Despite a series of 
relatively stable electoral outcomes in past decades, the Irish electorate has exhibited 
a substantial latent potential for electoral change for quite some time.
10
 The 2011 
election was unusual in that the shock of economic collapse catalyzed the political 
uncertainty of the Irish electorate into an exceptionally high level of aggregate 
electoral change. Importantly for the research presented here, the campaign itself was 
also marked by a substantial increase in use of the Internet by candidates, parties, 
media, and voters, relative to the previous election in 2007.
11
 The web was 
effectively a politically relevant medium during the campaign.    
 
 
The Internet and Political Uncertainty: Theory and Hypotheses 
 
                                                 
8
 Michael Marsh, ‘Party identification in Ireland: An insecure anchor for a floating party system’, 
Electoral Studies,  25 (2006), 489 – 508, p. 491. 
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 Martin Kroh, Wouter van der Brug, and Cees van der Eijk.  ‘Prospects for electoral change’, in 
Wouter van der Brug and Cees van der Eijk, eds, European elections and domestic politics: Lessons 
from the past and scenarios for the future (Contemporary European politics and society), (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), pp. 209-26. 
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Election, (Dublin: Palgrave McMilland, 2011) pp. 89-106.  
Levels of political uncertainty are not static, either across national populations or 
within them over time. The highly stable, frozen party-system scenario of Western 
Europe in the late 1960s, as described by Lipset and Rokkan,
12
 was driven by the 
capacity of parties to structure political competition along stable societal cleavages 
and to thus align themselves with clearly defined segments of electorates. In a series 
of roughly contemporaneous studies in the United States, both the ‘Michigan’ and 
‘Columbia’ schools also found partisan attachment to be a highly fixed aspect of 
political life, with Campbell et al.
13
 arguing that ‘[O]nly an event of extraordinary 
intensity can arouse any significant part of the electorate to the point that its 
established political loyalties are shaken’.  
However, since that time, levels of electoral uncertainty have increased steadily in 
established democracies around the world. Indicators of this trend include: growth in 
levels of aggregate electoral volatility,
14
 growth in the proportion of individuals who 
indicate that they are highly likely to vote for more than one party,
15
 an erosion of 
party membership numbers,
16
 declining levels of self-reported partisan identification 
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 Russell J. Dalton. and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds. Parties without Partisans: Political Change in 
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in surveys,
17
 increases in the numbers of electoral late deciders,
18
 and decreases in 
the predictive power of socio-economic characteristics and of ideological self-
placement for individual-level models of vote choice.
19
  
Although a marked decline in partisanship has thus been noted in numerous studies 
of established democracies across the globe, relatively little is currently known about 
the factors that either foster or inhibit political certainty at the individual level. For 
instance, Mayer, in his edited collection on American ‘swing voters’20 notes: ‘as far 
as I can determine, there is not a single journal article and just one book devoted to 
the subject’. Some of the classic U.S. voting behaviour literature does touch on the 





 refines this position, arguing that individuals 
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 Russell J. Dalton, ‘The Decline of Party Identifications’ in Russell J. Dalton. and Martin P. 
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 9-37.  
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Farrell and Rudiger Schmitt-Beck, eds. Do Political Campaigns Matter? Campaign Effects in 
Elections and Referendums,  (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 22-40. 
19Wouter van der Brug, ‘Structural and Ideological Voting in Age Cohorts’, West European Politics, 
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Trenaman  and Dennis McQuail, Television and Political Image, (London: Methuen, 1961).  
with moderate levels of political information and knowledge are in fact the most 
open to being influenced by political information. From a European perspective, 
however, Daudt and van der Eijk and Niemöller 
23
 find little evidence to support the 
hypothesis that ‘floating’ or ‘swing’ voters are any less (or more) politically 
informed than loyal partisans in the Dutch population. Indeed, Kroh et al.’s 
individual-level analysis
24
 suggests that political attentiveness may in fact be 
negatively related to uncertainty, though this finding is not consistent across all 
models.  
Among the factors that have been discussed as possible causes of partisan 
dealignment, the media environment has consistently loomed large. For instance, 
Dalton
25
 argues that a growth in the availability of news from independent broadcast 
media along with an array of societal changes (especially in terms of education 
levels) provide modern voters with both more politically diverse information and 
greater cognitive capacity to process this information than their forbearers enjoyed. 
Kroh et al.
26
 find that TV news consumption, in concert with several other 
individual- and national-level factors, plays a significant part in determining 
individuals’ levels of political uncertainty. 
Clearly, information is vital to political decision-making, including vote choice. 
However, the communication of information requires a medium. Each type of 
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 John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 
1992). 
23
 Harry Daudt, Floating voters and the floating vote, (Leiden: Stenfert Kroese, 1961);  Cees van der 
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measurement, (Amsterdam: CT Press, 1983). 
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medium has its own distinctive technological advantages and limitations, which 
dictate the type of information that is imparted to the voter, or – to borrow 
McLuhan’s  more evocative phraseology – the medium is the message.27  
A body of empirical literature demonstrates that traditional media use and voting 
behaviour are related, finding that exposure to television news, radio and newspapers 





 and vote choice.
30
 Other studies have established a causal relationship 
between public opinion on a range of topics and exposure to traditional media.
31
 
How the Internet contributes to determining citizens’ political views and behaviour 
remains overlooked in the literature.    
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 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media, (New York: Signet Books, 1964).  
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30
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‘Unintended media effects in a conflict environment: Serbian radio and Croatian nationalism’; 
McDonald Ladd and Lenz,  ‘Exploiting a Rare Communication Shift to Document the Persuasive 
Power of News Media’ Enikolopov, Petrova and Zhuravskaya, ‘Media and Political Persuasion: 
Evidence from Russia’. 
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The advent of the Internet as a widely available technology in the 1990s, and its 
more recent ‘Web 2.0’ incarnation,32 has dramatically advanced the fragmentation of 
the modern voter’s media environment. 33  However, the direction of an Internet 
‘effect’ on voter uncertainty is not clear a priori. Two schools of thought have 
characterized the broader debate on the effect that the Internet may have on political 
information and political engagement, and we use the arguments and research 
proposed by each school to develop two alternative empirical hypotheses.  
The first school of thought on the Internet and its political effects comprises several 
scholars
34
 who have argued that the Internet is a medium that facilitates selective 
exposure of content, leading users to reinforce their pre-existent beliefs. They argue 
that the pull-in nature of the Internet leads individuals to explore the web by 
searching among information sources and loci that are already in line with their 
preferences. Rather than an open market square, such a view depicts the Internet as a 
collection of private members’ clubs, where the likelihood of bumping into outsiders 
                                                 
32
 Paul Anderson, ‘What is Web 2.0? Ideas, technologies and implications for education’, JISC 
Technology & Standards Watch, 2007.  Available from  
http://www.jisc.ac.uk/media/documents/techwatch/tsw0701b.pdf, accessed 12 December 2012. 
33
 David Tewksbury and Jason Rittenberg,  News on the Internet: Information and Citizenship in the 
21st Century (Oxford Studies in Digital Politics), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
34
 Bruce A. Bimber and Richard Davis, Campaigning online: The Internet in US elections, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Diana C.  Mutz, and Paul S. Martin, ‘Facilitating 
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Science Review, 95(2001), 97-114;  Cass Sunstein, Republic.com, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2001); Cass Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2012);  Trenaman and McQuail, Television and Political Image. 
is practically nil. Furthermore, Pariser
35
 argues that the Internet’s extensive reliance 
on targeted advertising and automated personalization software creates ‘filter 
bubbles’, where users are exposed primarily to content that reflects their prior 
choices and dispositions, without necessarily realizing that this is the case. Generally, 
this view would lead us to expect that Internet exposure/use serves to confirm voters’ 
prior preferences. Empirically, we test this contention by specifying the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1: Internet use for newsgathering during a political campaign is associated 
with lower levels of political uncertainty among voters, ceteris paribus.  
 
Opposing the line of thought encapsulated in H1 are a number of studies
36
 which 
indicate that use of the Internet can challenge traditional social boundaries by 
exposing users to alternative opinions, views and sources. While habit and prior 
preferences do play a significant part in determining one’s online news experience, it 
appears that exposure to dissonant views still occurs on the word wide web. For 
instance, Garret et al.
37
 found that Americans’ use of attitude-consistent online 
sources positively correlates with consumption of attitudinally challenging sources. 
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 Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding From You, (New York: Penguin Press, 
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37
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November 2011. Available from DOI: 10.1007/s11109-011-9185-6, accessed 09 December 2012. 
Tweksbury and Rittenburg
38
 characterize the findings of empirical studies on news 
selectivity as indicating that, for Internet news consumers, ‘selectivity occurs through 
a mixture of purposeful evaluation of sites and topics and healthy doses of habit and 
chance’. Furthermore, the Internet hosts content that is both more voluminous and 
more diverse (in terms of fragmentation of content creators) than the content 
available in ‘traditional’ media. These considerations would lead us to anticipate that 
exposure to diverse information online should lessen voters’ political certainty. This 
logic leads us to specify an alternative hypothesis: 
 
H2: Internet use for newsgathering during a political campaign is associated 
with higher levels of political uncertainty among voters, ceteris paribus. 
 
Extant research on empirical patterns of web use indicates that the Internet is a 
medium where users do frequently encounter content that challenges their prior 
preferences. A number of contributions point towards such a scenario: Gentzkow and 
Shapiro find that web users frequently browse websites that feature content that runs 
contrary to their ideological leanings, leading them to conclude that ‘the Internet is 
far from segregated’.39 Valentino and co-authors, by means of a lab experiment, 
demonstrate that is not uncommon for citizens to seek out information that 
challenges their attitudes and opinions.
 40
 Furthermore, Gibson and McAllister’s 
                                                 
38
 Tewksbury and Rittenberg, News on the Internet, p. 68. 
39
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40
 Nicholas A. Valentino, Antoine J. Banks, Vincent L. Hutchings and Anne K. Davis,  ‘Selective 
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study
41
 of the Australian 2004 general election concludes that ‘online election news 




In this research, as in many other studies of individuals, organizations and societies, 
we confront a fundamental problem of causal inference: the impossibility of 
observing the counterfactual, i.e. the outcome for the same unit in the absence of the 
treatment.
42
 The ideal scenario from a methodological standpoint would be a random 
assignment of the possibility of browsing political news online to individuals, i.e. a 
true experiment. Given random assignment, we could simply compare the two 
groups.
43
 The difference between the average levels of electoral uncertainty for the 
treated group and the average level of uncertainty for the control group would 
constitute the causal effect of Internet newsgathering, since both groups would be 
comparable with respect to observed and unobserved confounding factors. However, 
                                                 
41
 Rachel Gibson and Ian McAllister,  ‘Does cyber campaigning win votes? Online communication in 
the 2004 Australian election’, Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties 16 (2006), 243–63, p. 
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this ideal scenario is not feasible with observational data drawn from a representative 
sample of society at a given point in time. Simply put, browsing for political news 
online is not randomly assigned to individuals.  
One approach to addressing this issue is to control for those characteristics that are 
likely to affect both the probability of going online and political uncertainty. For 
instance, we could use multivariate regressions or matching techniques employing a 
set of control variables. However, this would not help us with the problem of 
selection on unobserved factors that are correlated with the treatment and the 
outcome variable. This selection effect would induce correlation between the 
dependent variable and the error term, which undermines causal inference.  
In this context, instrumental variables can be an effective identification strategy. We 
exploit the fact that broadband coverage is geographically variable in the Republic of 
Ireland during the period under investigation. By instrumenting patterns of Internet 
newsgathering (our treatment) on the basis of broadband coverage (our instrument), 
we can estimate a treatment effect by finding a control group that is similar enough 
to the treatment group in all the covariates, except that it does not enjoy broadband 
coverage. In this way, our methodological approach facilitates the identification of 
our treatment’s effect on the dependent variable (i.e. the electoral uncertainty of 
individual voters). Moreover, we include in our models a number of elements that 
previous studies have found to be related to voter uncertainty, in order to further 







We use data from the INES 2011, the third national election study conducted in the 
Republic of Ireland.
44
 In order to perform our analysis, we first created a new 
individual-level variable for the INES 2011 dataset, broadband coverage, which 
accounts for the availability of broadband to each respondent. First, we encoded the 
location (latitude and longitude) of all respondents, and we then performed a search 
for broadband coverage in each respondent’s geographical location. 45  The 1,854 
respondents to the INES 2011 lived in 309 different geographical locations (i.e. an 
average of six respondents per location in the survey). For those locations where all 
sources indicated no broadband coverage, we also performed a final check by 
searching for the keywords ‘location+broadband’ on google.ie.46 Figure 1 maps the 
geographical distribution of the broadband coverage variable in the Republic of 
Ireland. Red dots are locations where respondents did not have broadband coverage, 
whereas black dots represent the locations of respondents who lived in areas with 
broadband availability.    
                                                 
44
 The 2011 INES is only a post-election survey; a pre-election wave was not run.  
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The dependent variable in this study is the level of electoral uncertainty of individual 
voters. As this study takes place in a multiparty system, the operationalization of 
electoral uncertainty is complex, and in this section we therefore outline the rationale 
behind our two measures of electoral uncertainty. We impute two metrics from our 
data: the first of these, Potential for Switching, is designed to capture an individual’s 
potential for vote switching between their two most-preferred parties. The second 
metric, Openness, employs data from voters’ evaluations of all of the major parties 
competing in a given election. Both measures rely on a well-developed survey 
instrument that captures voters’ orientations towards parties via a battery of items on 
their ‘propensity to vote’ (PTV) for each party. The PTV question from the 2011 
INES reads: 
“How probable is it that you will ever give your first preference vote to the 
following parties? Please use the numbers on this scale to indicate your views, 
where ‘1’ means ‘NOT AT ALL PROBABLE’ and ‘10’ means ‘VERY 




 define likely switchers as those respondents who either have two or 
more parties tied for their highest probability score, or whose second preference is 
only one point less than their first. This approach generates a binary measure, taking 
the value of ‘1’ for likely switchers and the value of ‘0’ for non-switchers.48 Table 2 
displays the proportion of likely switchers in the Irish population as measured 
according to this metric in the three election-year INES studies (2002; 2007; 2011).  
 
Table 2. Proportion of potential switchers over three INES studies. 
 
 % Switchers % Non switchers 
2002 50.7 49.3 
2007 51.5 49.5 
2011 50.3 49.7 
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 Kroh, van der Brug and van der Eijk. 2007.‘Prospects for electoral change’. 
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 We do not use this variable in out inferential analysis for two reasons: firstly, its binary form does 
not account for possible important differences among those considered to be ‘switchers’. Secondly, 
this dichotomous measure is very sensitive to changes in the number of observations, potentially 
leading to blurry results. 
Kroh et al.
49
 develop a continuous measure of the degree to which a voter is certain 
of voting for their most-preferred party – and we employ this measure as our first 
dependent variable, ‘Potential for Switching’, in our analysis. This measure is 
obtained by computing the difference between each respondent’s two most-preferred 
parties. This figure is then multiplied by -1; the variable thus ranges from -10 to 0, 
where -10 indicates a high degree of certainty that the respondent will vote for their 
most preferred party and 0 indicates that they are equally likely to vote for at least 
two parties.  
We complement Potential for Switching with a second dependent variable 
operationalization, Openness. The Openness index is an adaptation of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman (hereafter HH) index. The HH index and revised forms of it 
(inverse and/or normalized versions) have already been used extensively in political 
science analyses. For instance, the index has been adapted to measure the extent of 
societal fragmentation of states
50
 and for the well-known ‘effective number of 
parties’ measure of vote and seat fragmentation.51  
We compute Openness using a normalized version of the Herfindahl-Hirschman 










xHH   (1), 
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 Kroh, van der Brug and van der Eijk. ‘Prospects for electoral change’. 
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  For a detailed discussion, see Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer,  William Easterly, Sergio 
Kurlat,  and Romain Wacziarg, ‘Fractionalization’, Journal of Economic Growth 8 (2003), 155–94. 
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 Markuu  Laakso and Rein Taagepera, ‘Effective number of parties: a measure with application to 




 is the PTV of each party divided by the total of all the probabilities filled 
in by respondents. This variable ranges between 0 and 1. For instance, a respondent 
who gives a PTV of 10 to party X and a PTV of 0 to all the remaining parties would 
have an HH equal to 1. The more closely the HH value approaches 0, the greater the 
extent to which the respondent is divided between multiple parties. In order to make 
our discussion of the Openness index more intuitive, we reverse the HH metric score; 
so that high values correspond to higher levels of electoral openness. Thus, for both 
measures of our dependent variable, an increase in the value of the metric indicates 




We code a binary variable Internet that takes the value ‘1’ for respondents who 
browse online for news at least once per week and ‘0’ for respondents who never go 
online for news. The set of respondents who browse online news is defined as the 
treatment group, whereas the set of respondents who do not go online is defined as 
the control group.
52
 Specifically, our treatment is built on the following question 
from the INES survey: 
“On a scale of 0-7 where 0 means ‘never’, 1 means one day a week, 2 means 
two days a week, and so on until 7 means ‘every day’ of the week, how often do 
you browse online for news”. 
 
We recoded this ordinal variable as a dummy to facilitate the interpretation of our 
results. We could also think of browsing online news as an ordinal treatment, but that 
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 Paul R. Rosenbaum, Observational studies. 2
nd
 edition, (New York: Springer, 2002); Rubin,  
‘Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomized and nonrandomized studies’. 
would further complicate the identification strategy.
53
 In the Appendix we show that 
this coding decision does not affect our results. In our dataset, 311 respondents report 




To reduce the danger of confounding factors driving our results, we include a large 
number of control variables. In specifying our models we follow Kroh et al.
54
 In 
particular, we begin with a baseline model that includes only Socio-Economic Status 
variables. Then we enrich this parsimonious model by including two additional sets 
of variables: Political Involvement; and Political Attitudes and Opinions.    
Socio-Economic Status characteristics include age; gender; education; and social 
class. In terms of Political Involvement, we include variables accounting for 
individuals’ party identification (which is negatively related to political uncertainty); 
frequency of watching political television; of reading newspapers; of listening to the 
radio; and political attentiveness. Regarding Political Attitudes and Opinions, we 
include left-right self-placement and extremeness; a variable capturing whether the 
respondent voted for Fianna Fáil in the previous elections; a variable distinguishing 
between vote as duty versus vote as choice; and a variable that scores one if the 
respondent agrees with a statement claiming that voting matters. Finally, we include 
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 Guido W.  Imbens, and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge,  ‘Recent developments in the econometrics of 
program evaluation’, Journal of Economic Literature, 47 (2009), 5-86; Kern and Hainmueller,  
‘Opium for the Masses: How Foreign Media Can Stabilize Authoritarian Regimes’. 
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 Kroh, van der Brug and van der Eijk. ‘Prospects for electoral change’. 
a variable capturing whether a candidate visited the respondent during the campaign. 




Traditional techniques such as linear OLS regression are limited in their capacity to 
establish causation because they fail to control for endogenous causal relationships 
between independent and dependent variables. Internet use, the purportedly 
independent variable in our study, is indeed endogenous to several of the individual-
level characteristics that we use to predict uncertainty in vote choice. We therefore 
estimate our model by instrumenting patterns of Internet use on the basis of Internet 
availability and a set of covariates.
55
 We do so by implementing Two-Stage-Least-





, several nonparametric assumptions allow one to identify 
causal effects in an instrumental variable (IV) model. First, and most importantly, a 
crucial requirement is that the area in which a respondent lives is ‘as good as 
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 As the first equation outcome is dichotomous, we opted for the TREATREG estimates. IVREG2 
estimates are reported in the Appendix. 
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 Alberto Abadie, ‘Semiparametric instrumental variable estimation of treatment response models’, 
Journal of Econometrics 113 (2003), 231–63. 
 
randomly assigned’, once we condition on control variables.  Moreover, and 
relatedly, our instrument, i.e. broadband coverage, should explain the variation of 
the dependent variable only through its effect on our treatment, i.e. Internet. These 
two assumptions together imply that, once we control for a set of covariates, living in 
an area without broadband per se should only impact on a respondents’ electoral 
certainty via their capacity and propensity to gather news on the Internet.  
A way to make sure that these two assumptions are met is to show that areas with 
broadband coverage are similar to areas without coverage in relation to 
characteristics that might affect our outcome variables. Our advantage is that we can 
check an extensive number of individual-level characteristics that are available from 
the 2011 INES survey. Here we concentrate on a limited number of these 
characteristics, focusing on the variables that we employ as controls in our analytical 
models. An analysis of balance across a larger number of variables can be found in 
the Appendix. As Figure 2 shows, areas with broadband and areas without broadband 
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 The graph does not include age, which does not scale with the other variables. The distribution of 
age is balanced, with a median of 43 for the group with broadband and 45 for the group without. 25th 
and 75th percentiles are 34 and 60 years for the group without broadband coverage and 32 and 57 for 
the group with broadband coverage.  
 Figure 2. Box plots of the covariate distribution in areas with and without 
broadband coverage 
   
 
The variables that display a slightly diverse distribution between the two groups are: 
party identification (the ratio of party identifiers versus non-identifiers is about 7% 
higher for the areas with broadband coverage); education; and self-placement on the 
left-right dimension.
59
 However, these differences between the treatment and control 
groups are relatively minor, and we deal with them in the Robustness Checks 
section. Overall, there is little evidence that differences among areas with and 
without broadband coverage could invalidate the exclusion restriction.  
A second assumption requires that broadband coverage is a strong instrument for 
browsing for political news. In other words, broadband coverage must be highly 
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 A T-test shows that for both variables [mean(Z0)–mean(Z1)] is not statistically different from zero at 
the conventional level. 















No broadband coverage Broadband coverage
Covariates
correlated with Internet use, conditional on the set of control variables. Table 3 
below shows that living in an area with broadband coverage (according to our 
broadband coverage variable) is strongly correlated with the probability of 
‘browsing for political news online’ (our Internet variable). 60  The correlation 
between the variables is 0.41. Moreover, when we regress broadband coverage on 
Internet, controlling for a large number of covariates, exposure is statistically 




Table 3. Browsing political news and broadband coverage. 
Browsing political news online 
(days per week) 
Leaving in 
Areas without broadband 
coverage 
Areas with broadband coverage 
0 425 945 
1 21 52 
2 19 41 
3 0 56 
4 0 47 
5 0 35 
6 0 30 
7 0 83 
Total 465 1,289 
 
A final assumption underlying our analytical approach requires no inverse 
relationship between Internet exposure and browsing for political news. Given that 
broadband exposure greatly facilitates Internet use generally, and the strongly 
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 We speculate that some respondents browse political news when they are not at home, i.e. at work, 
or that they browse political news online using mobile phones, while others may have broadband 
access but little interest in current affairs. 
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 As suggested by Joshua D. Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An 
Empiricist's Companion. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), pp.217-18, we employ some 
commonly used tests with instrumental variables. Specifically, in all the analyses the Kleibergen-Paap 
test shows that our models are not under-identified. Similarly, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic (also 
known as Stock-Yogo test) shows that our models are not weakly identified. 
positive relationship between ‘exposure’ and ‘broadband’ observed in our data, we 






We begin by estimating the baseline models (Socio-Economic Status) for both of our 
dependent variables. Then we add two other sets of control variables: Political 
Involvement and Political Attitudes and Opinions.
63
 Table 4 reports coefficients and 
confidence intervals for parameter estimates of both the first stage and the second 
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 We acknowledge that people may access the Internet via 3G devices and/or access internet at the 
workplace. However, as long as 3G use or accessing the Internet from work is not systematically 
related to broadband access, our effects should still be identified. What is more, such a possibility may 
run against our effect. Indeed, if people in places with no broadband availability have other means of 
accessing the Internet, our effects should be underestimated. 
63
 As we add covariates, we lose observations due to missing values. 
 Table 4 TREATREG: Internet  instrumented using Broadband Coverage. The reference category for Left/Right placement (L/R) is those 
who did not place themselves (Don’t know). Robust C.I. in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Potential for vote switching Openness 
Internet 1.14*** 1.13*** 1.35*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 (0.42 - 1.86) (0.38 - 1.89) (0.52 - 2.19) (0.02 - 0.06) (0.02 - 0.06) (0.01 - 0.06) 
Socio-Economic Status       
Gender -0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.22 - 0.19) (-0.15 - 0.27)  (-0.27 - 0.22) (-0.01 - 0.00) (-0.01 - 0.00) (-0.01 - 0.00) 
Education 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.13** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.04 - 0.23) (0.05 - 0.25) (0.01 - 0.25) (0.00 - 0.01) (0.00 - 0.01) (0.00 - 0.01) 
Age -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (-0.02 - -0.01) (-0.02 - -0.00) (-0.03 - -0.01) (-0.00 - -0.00) (-0.00 - -0.00) (-0.00 - -0.00) 
Class -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (-0.10 - 0.05) (-0.09 - 0.06) (-0.14 - 0.04) (-0.00 - 0.00) (-0.00 - 0.00) (-0.00 - 0.00) 
Political Involvement       
TV  -0.03 0.00  -0.00 0.00 
  (-0.09 - 0.04) (-0.08 - 0.08)  (-0.00 - 0.00) (-0.00 - 0.00) 
Newspaper  0.07*** 0.07**  0.00*** 0.00*** 
  (0.02 - 0.12) (0.01 - 0.12)  (0.00 - 0.00) (0.00 - 0.00) 
Radio  0.04 -0.01  -0.00 -0.00 
  (-0.02 - 0.10) (-0.08 - 0.06)  (-0.00 - 0.00) (-0.00 - 0.00) 
Party Identification  -0.97*** -0.85***  -0.02*** -0.01*** 
  (-1.23 - -0.71) (-1.14 - -0.56)  (-0.03 - -0.01) (-0.02 - -0.01) 
Interest in Politics  -0.14* -0.07  -0.01*** -0.01** 
  (-0.28 - 0.00) (-0.23 - 0.10)  (-0.01 - -0.00) (-0.01 - -0.00) 
Candidate Visit  -0.01 0.04  -0.00 -0.00 
  (-0.19 - 0.16) (-0.18 - 0.25)  (-0.00 - 0.00) (-0.01 - 0.00) 
Political Attitudes and 
Opinions 
      
Vote Matters   0.02   0.00*** 
   (-0.05 - 0.09)   (0.00 - 0.01) 
L/R (Centre)   0.29   0.01** 
   (-0.12 - 0.70)   (0.00 - 0.02) 
L/R (Extremes)   0.02   0.00 
   (-0.44 - 0.47)   (-0.01 - 0.01) 
Duty vs Choice   0.22   0.00 
   (-0.06 - 0.50)   (-0.00 - 0.01) 
Previous Fianna Fáil   0.25**   0.01*** 
   (0.01 - 0.50)   (0.00 - 0.02) 
Broadband coverage 1.00*** 0.99*** 0.90*** 1.00*** 0.98*** 0.89*** 
(first stage) (0.79 - 1.22) (0.77 - 1.21) (0.66 - 1.14) (0.78 - 1.22) (0.77 - 1.20) (0.65 - 1.13) 
Constant -1.99*** -2.05*** -2.45*** 0.79*** 0.80*** 0.77*** 
 (-2.67 - -1.32) (-2.86 - -1.24) (-3.63 - -1.27) (0.78 - 0.81) (0.78 - 0.82) (0.74 - 0.80) 




The statistical significance (with 99% confidence) of the Internet effect is constant 
across the two dependent variables, which indicates that browsing online for news 
has an impact on electoral certainty, ceteris paribus.  The direction of this effect is 
positive, implying that those who used the Internet for gathering politically relevant 
information in the 2011 Irish election campaign were more electorally uncertain – a 
finding that supports H2, and invalidates H1. These outputs also show that the 
variable accounting for online newsgathering (Internet) has a wide confidence 
interval, meaning that the amount of extra uncertainty determined by using the 
Internet for political news is difficult to specify precisely.
64
 The coefficient for online 
newsgathering shows that online information (versus no use of the Internet for 
political news) corresponds to an increase of about one unit on the categorical 
measure of Potential for vote switching (which ranges from -10 to 0). The coefficient 
for the Openness measure indicates that using the internet makes voters 4% more 
‘open’ to multiple parties, ceteris paribus. However, looking at these coefficients in 
relation to other variables in the models is more meaningful. Therefore, we briefly 
discuss these under the following three categories: Socio-Economic Status; Political 
Involvement; and Political Attitudes and Opinions.
65
  
First, in terms of Socio-Economic Status, age and education are significant predictors 
of electoral openness and potential for switching. Age, as expected, is negatively 
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 The standard error of an IV estimate is usually much larger than that of an OLS estimate 
(Wooldridge, 2009).   
65
 Several control variables have small coefficients that approximate to zero if we use two decimal 
places. 
 30 
related to electoral certainty – a finding that is in line with several previous studies,66 
while educational attainment is positively related to uncertainty. Gender and class, 
on the other hand, have no statistically discernible effect – a finding that chimes with 
Kroh et al.’s (2007) comparative study.  
The Political Involvement variables seek to capture the influence of other media, 
general levels of political interest and party identification on electoral uncertainty. 
The effect of reading a newspaper is positive and significant, while watching TV 
fails to reach conventional significance levels.  
The magnitude of the effect of Internet on the outcome variables is also substantial, 
when compared to other media. For instance, gathering news online affects voters’ 
certainty three times more than reading newspapers for both dependent variables. 
67
 
 The negative sign of the coefficient for Interest in Politics suggests that those who 
assess themselves as being more interested in politics have more stable vote 
preferences and less electoral openness to multiple parties. Our outputs also indicate 
that, as expected, party identification is negatively related to political uncertainty.  
Finally, being visited at one’s home by candidates standing for election does not 
have an impact on the dependent variable, which is surprising given the importance 
ascribed to door-to-door canvassing by candidates in Ireland’s ‘pre modern’ 
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 To ease the comparison across variables we transformed TV, Radio and Newspaper into dummies. 
Coefficients are TV (-0.75), Radio (-0.10), Newspaper (0.34) for Model 2 on Potential for vote 





  The magnitude of the coefficients for Party Identification 
is similar to that of those accounting for online newsgathering, especially in Models 
2 and 5. Specifically, if an individual identifies with a political party his\her 
likelihood of being uncertain is shifted about 1 point down the scale for Potential for 
vote switching. Online newsgathering produces a similar shift in the opposite 
direction.  
With regard to the role of Political Attitudes and Opinions, we find that former 
Fianna Fáil voters were more uncertain than the rest of the population, which is 
understandable given the context of the election. It is worth noting that the 
magnitude of this effect is much smaller than that associated with online 
newsgathering (in both Models 2 and 5). Interestingly, we find some evidence 
(though not across alternative dependent variable specifications) that those who feel 
that their vote matters, and that voting is a duty (rather than a choice) were more 
politically uncertain. We also find inconsistent evidence that those who place 
themselves at the centre of the left-right continuum are less electorally uncertain than 
those who did not know how to place themselves on the scale (reference category). 
We find no evidence that ‘extremists’ on the left-right scale are significantly 





Balancing areas with and without broadband coverage is key to correctly identifying 
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 Michael Marsh,  ‘None of that post-modern stuff around here: Grassroots Campaigning in the 2002 
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the effect of the Internet on voter uncertainty. As such, we implement two types of 
additional analysis designed to sharpen our identification strategy, and provide 
greater certainty of the validity of our core finding.  
First, although areas with broadband coverage and areas without proved to have 
similar features in terms of possible confounding factors, some minor imbalances 
still remain in a few variables, i.e. education, left-right placement (extremists), and 
party identification. To further balance the two types of constituency, we seek help 
from geography. A sceptical reader might argue that a ‘capital city divide’ drives our 
results, as the entire Dublin area has broadband coverage and Internet use is more 
frequent among Dubliners than non-Dubliners in our sample. To rule out this 
possibility, we introduce a variable ‘Distance’, which measures in miles how far a 
respondent’s location is from Dublin city centre. 69  If distance from Dublin is 
correlated with both our dependent variable and with browsing for news online, then 
the variable ‘Distance’ should account for this causal channel. As such, if our results 
maintain their significance despite the inclusion of ‘Distance’ (in models 7 and 8), 
we can be confident that a ‘Dublin divide’ is not the underlying factor driving our 
results. 
Second, we implement a matching technique to further balance constituencies with 
and without broadband (models 9 and 10). Specifically, we match our instrument on 
distance from the closest unit (either a village or a neighbourhood) in the other group, 
as socio-economic characteristics are usually geographically clustered. Moreover, we 
match Broadband Coverage on the three covariates that are slightly unbalanced: 
education, extremisms, and party identification.  
This test is both important and quite conservative. It is important, because if these 
pre-treatment variables, which are unbalanced, affect the dependent variables, our 
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instrumental variable estimation does not address the issue of confounding factors. 
Put simply, the effect of the Internet on electoral certainty could occur via these 
slightly unbalanced variables, which happen to be correlated with both the treatment 
and the instrument. It is conservative, because by reducing our sample we increase 
the error around our estimates. 
We make use of the STATA 11 module of the Coarsened Exact Matching 
Software.
70
  By adopting this approach, the L1 overall balance measure (which 
captures the imbalance for the full joint distribution) drops from 0.47 to 0.03, 
reducing by 94% the imbalance of the full joint distribution. The sample size suffers 
a reduction of 57 observations among those without broadband coverage and 237 
among those with broadband coverage.
71
 Table 5 below reports estimate results for 
both dependent variables controlling for distance in the full sample (models 7 and 8) 
and in the matched one (models 9 and 10).  
Table 5. Distance from Dublin and matching. Internet instrumented using 
Broadband Coverage. The reference category for Left/Right placement (L/R) is 
those who did not place themselves (Don’t know). Robust C.I. in parentheses. 
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vote switching Openness 
Potential for 
vote switching Openness 
  (7)  (8) (9) (10) 
Internet 1.23*** 0.04*** 1.02** 0.04*** 
 
(0.32 - 2.14) (0.01 - 0.06) (0.06 - 1.97) (0.01 - 0.05) 
Socio-Economic 
Status     
Gender -0.03 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 
 
(-0.27 - 0.21) (-0.01 - 0.00) (-0.24 - 0.28) (-0.01 - 0.01) 
Education 0.12** 0.00*** 0.19*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.00 - 0.24) (0.00 - 0.01) (0.05 - 0.32) (0.00 - 0.01) 
Age -0.02*** -0.00*** -0.02*** -0.00*** 
 
(-0.03 - -0.01) (-0.00 - -0.00) (-0.03 - -0.01) (-0.00 - -0.00) 
Class -0.04 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 
(-0.13 - 0.05) (-0.00 - 0.00) (-0.47 - 0.56) (-0.00 - 0.00) 
Political 
Involvement     
TV -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 
(-0.09 - 0.08) (-0.00 - 0.00) (-0.08 - 0.10) (-0.00 - 0.00) 
Newspaper 0.06** 0.00*** 0.05* 0.00** 
 
(0.01 - 0.11) (0.00 - 0.00) (-0.01 - 0.11) (0.00 - 0.00) 
Radio -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(-0.08 - 0.06) (-0.00 - 0.00) (-0.08 - 0.08) (-0.00 - 0.00) 
Party Identification -0.80*** -0.01*** -1.02*** -0.01** 
 
(-1.09 - -0.51) (-0.02 - -0.01) (-1.47 - -0.56) (-0.03 - -0.00) 
Interest in Politics -0.10 -0.01** 0.02 -0.00 
 
(-0.27 - 0.07) (-0.01 - -0.00) (-0.18 - 0.22) (-0.01 - 0.00) 
Candidate Visit 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 
(-0.20 - 0.22) (-0.01 - 0.00) (-0.22 - 0.23) (-0.01 - 0.00) 
Political Attitudes 
and Opinions     
Vote Matters 0.01 0.00*** 0.04 0.00*** 
 
(-0.06 - 0.08) (0.00 - 0.01) (-0.04 - 0.12) (0.00 - 0.01) 
L/R (Centre) 0.32 0.01** 0.38 0.02*** 
 
(-0.08 - 0.73) (0.00 - 0.02) (-0.09 - 0.85) (0.01 - 0.03) 
L/R (Extremes) 0.11 0.00 0.17 0.01 
 
(-0.34 - 0.56) (-0.01 - 0.01) (-0.37 - 0.70) (-0.01 - 0.02) 
Duty vs Choice 0.26* 0.00 0.39*** 0.00 
 
(-0.02 - 0.54) (-0.00 - 0.01) (-0.11 - 0.67) (-0.00 - 0.01) 
Previous Fianna Fáil 0.31** 0.01*** 0.33** 0.01*** 
 
(0.06 - 0.55) (0.00 - 0.02) (0.06 - 0.61) (0.00 - 0.01) 
Distance from 
Dublin -0.00*** 0.00 
  
 
(-0.01 - -0.00) (-0.00 - 0.00) 





   
(-0.01 - -0.00) (-0.00 - 0.00) 
Broadband coverage 
(first stage) 0.89*** 0.89*** 0.82*** 0.82*** 
 
(0.65 - 1.13) (0.65 - 1.13) (0.56 - 1.08) (0.57 - 1.08) 
Constant -2.07*** 0.77*** -3.12*** 0.76*** 
 
(-3.27 - -0.88) (0.74 - 0.80) (-4.51 - -1.74) (0.72 - 0.79) 
Matching  no no Yes yes 
Observations 1,321 1,321 1,098 1,098 
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The outputs of the analysis on matched observations do not change significantly; for 
both dependent variables we obtain estimates that are very consistent with those 
reported in Table 4. Thus, our findings are robust to both the control for geographical 
characteristics and the control for imbalance between treatment and control groups. 
The confidence intervals, especially in models 7 and 9, remain wide and coefficients 




Finally, we examine whether our findings are robust to the specification of an 
alternative instrumental variable to capture the effects of online newsgathering. Our 
analyses have thus far examined the effects of browsing online for politically 
relevant news, understood in a broad sense. Due to the multifaceted nature of the 
Internet as a medium, we are unable to map the specific sites visited and content 
encountered by our respondents. Here, we both check the robustness of our main 
finding and examine the effects of visiting a specific platform: Twitter.com.  
Twitter.com is a highly popular micro-blogging platform: it allows each user to post 
information (which must be parcelled into textual packets of no more than 140 
characters) to be viewed by all users who ‘follow’ their accounts. Such information 
includes text, hyperlinks to other websites, and video and audio files. Users can also 
‘retweet’ (i.e. copy and forward) other user’s posts to their followers. Thus, 
Twitter.com maximizes the fragmentation of news sources that we discuss in 
explaining the rationale behind H2. The likelihood that users will be exposed to 
information that runs contrary to their prior preferences (thus leaving them more 
politically uncertain) is maximized in the Twitter.com environment, where every 
user of the site is potentially a content creator.  On the other hand, each user decides 
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whom to follow, and thus may choose to build their own ‘filter bubble’ by following 
only those other users who they know are consonant with their prior preferences. If 
this use pattern is highly pervasive, then using Twitter.com may serve to reinforce 
























Table 6. Potential for vote switching and Openness. TREATREG: Twitter 
instrumented using Broadband Coverage. The reference category for Left/Right 
placement (L/R) is those who did not place themselves (Don’t know). Robust 






Potential for vote 
switching Openness 
  (11)   (12) 
Twitter 1.24** 0.05*** 
 
(0.19 - 2.29) (0.02 - 0.07) 
Socio-economic status   
Gender -0.03 -0.00 
 
(-0.27 - 0.22) (-0.01 - 0.00) 
Education 0.14** 0.00*** 
 
(0.02 - 0.26) (0.00 - 0.01) 
Age -0.02*** -0.00*** 
 
(-0.03 - -0.01) (-0.00 - -0.00) 
Class -0.05 -0.00 
 
(-0.14 - 0.04) (-0.00 - 0.00) 
Political involvement   
TV 0.00 0.00 
 
(-0.08 - 0.09) (-0.00 - 0.00) 
Newspaper 0.07** 0.00** 
 
(0.01 - 0.12) (0.00 - 0.00) 
Radio -0.01 -0.00 
 
(-0.08 - 0.06) (-0.00 - 0.00) 
Party Identification -0.86*** -0.01*** 
 
(-1.15 - -0.57) (-0.02 - -0.01) 
Interest in Politics -0.05 -0.00** 
 
(-0.22 - 0.11) (-0.01 - -0.00) 
Candidate Visit 0.04 -0.00 
 
(-0.17 - 0.25) (-0.01 - 0.00) 
Political attitudes and opinions   
Vote Matters 0.02 0.00*** 
 
(-0.05 - 0.09) (0.00 - 0.01) 
L/R (Centre) 0.30 0.01** 
 
(-0.11 - 0.71) (0.00 - 0.02) 
L/R (Extremes) 0.01 0.00 
 
(-0.44 - 0.46) (-0.01 - 0.01) 
Duty vs Choice 0.22 0.00 
 
(-0.06 - 0.50) (-0.00 - 0.01) 
Previous Fianna Fail 0.26** 0.01*** 
 
(0.01 - 0.50) (0.00 - 0.02) 
Broadband coverage 
(first stage) 0.70*** 0.70*** 
 
(0.41 - 0.98) (0.41 - 0.98) 
Constant -2.38*** 0.77*** 
 
(-3.56 - -1.20) (0.74 - 0.80) 
   Observations 1,321 1,321 
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As we can see from Table 6, the results are nearly identical to those in Table 4. The 
use of Twitter as a source of political news appears to leave Irish voters more 
electorally uncertain – with the finding being statistically significant at the 95% and 
99% levels in Table 6. Similarly to what we observed in models 2 and 5, using 
Twitter is about five times stronger in determining voters’ uncertainty than having 
been a Fianna Fáil voter in the past.  
Further robustness checks are reported in the Appendix to this article. The finding of 
a positive causal association between Internet newsgathering and political 




Our goal in this article has been to identify the causal impact of online newsgathering 
on voters’ electoral uncertainty. A causal understanding of the effects of the Internet 
is generally very difficult to achieve due to selection into treatment, which represents 
a well-known challenge for any analysis of the impact of media on public opinion. 
We have focused on the question of whether using the Internet to gather political 
information in the context of a general election affects voters’ certainty with regard 
to their vote choice. We have done this by implementing a quasi-experimental 
analytical approach built on variation in broadband availability in the Republic of 
Ireland. These analyses were made possible by the design of the 2011 INES, 
specifically the gathering of geo-location data on respondents, which allowed us to 
match individual respondent data to information about the availability of broadband 
in the area where they are resident. Several other election studies also collect geo-
location data, and broadband availability varies regionally in many states other than 
Ireland – the analytical approach presented in this article thus offers a 
 39 
methodological contribution to the study of the effects of Internet use by voters 
during election campaigns and should be applied to further studies.    
This research speaks to a wider debate about the political and social impact of the 
emergence of the Internet. Some argue that the web is a space where users can pre-
define the content that they receive in a manner that leads them to only receive 
information that is in line with their pre-existing preferences. The political 
implications of this argument are profound: Internet use may serve to re-enforce 
individuals’ existing partisan and ideological predispositions and to polarize groups 
with differing opinions. Others counter that the diversity of online news, and the ease 
with which multiple websites can be accessed via hyperlinks when browsing the 
web, make it a media platform where users will encounter information and political 
perspectives that challenge their pre-existing perspectives, and perhaps make them 
more open to understanding alternative political positions. A range of robustness 
checks have validated our core finding, namely that using the Internet as a news 
source led to greater electoral uncertainty among Irish citizens in the 2011 election 
campaign.  
At this point we cannot rule out the contention that national and contextual factors 
may condition the relationship between online newsgathering and electoral 
uncertainty – further research across a wider range of elections will be required to 
understand the conditionality of Internet effects on voters’ electoral preferences. 
Ireland’s 2011 election was exceptional in many respects – most notably the 
unfortunate economic situation, but also in terms of the lack of ideological 
competition among the main Irish parties. It is plausible that in a more ideologically 
polarized political environment, use of the Internet as a news source may lead to 
greater certainty among voters.   
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Furthermore, the mechanism(s) underlying the effects identified of the Internet on 
levels of political uncertainty require further research. It is extremely difficult to 
capture and classify the political content that is 1) available and 2) consumed online 
during political campaigns (or at any other time for that matter); this problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that the Internet itself is something of a ‘shifting target’ for 
analysts, a forum characterized by constant evolution in terms of the types of use that 
it facilitates. The next steps forward for research on this topic should provide more 
focus on differences in individual patterns of web use when newsgathering, and seek 
to develop methodological and analytical techniques that facilitate the identification 
of national-level, election-level and individual-level variables that condition the 
overall Internet effect identified here. Laboratory experiments, administering and 
controlling the type of online content browsed by individuals, may be an important 
tool for disentangling the aggregate phenomenon observed in our analysis.  
However, in terms of overall effect – it is clear from this analysis that Ireland’s wired 
voters are less electorally certain than their unwired counterparts, and this difference 
appears to be attributable to the influence of consuming political news online.   
 Our study has important implications for scholars of media and elections and for 
political actors. By empirically assessing the role of the Internet on voters’ 
uncertainty, we have shown that the media in fact influences voters and that online 
newsgathering gives them more information to base their decisions on. Importantly, 
we find that the magnitude of the effect of the Internet on the outcome variables is 
large compared to other determinants of vote switching. Thus, every study on voters’ 
uncertainty that neglects to take into account the role of the Internet suffers from a 
serious omitted variable problem.  Also, parties and candidates need to consider their 
online profile and the type of information one might encounter online, as this 
information is one of the determining factors of voters’ evaluations.  
